TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction
II. Purpose of the Plan
III. Scope of the Plan
IV. Planning Assumptions
V. Authorities
VI. Phases of a Pandemic
VII. Responsibilities
VIII. Concept of Operations
   A. Overview
   B. Direction and Control
   C. Communications
   D. Mitigation
   E. Surveillance
   F. Public Education
   G. Vaccines and Antiviral Medications
   H. Isolation and Quarantine
   I. Social Distancing Strategies
IX. Health and Medical Response
   A. Health Care System
   B. Public Health Services
X. Maintenance of Essential Services
XI. Recovery

Appendix A - King County Priority Groups For Influenza Vaccination During a Pandemic
Appendix B1 - US Department of Health and Human Services Guidelines for Dispensing Antivirals During and Influenza Pandemic
Appendix B2 - King County Priority Groups For Receiving Antiviral Medications During an Influenza Pandemic (under development)
Appendix C - PHSKC Pandemic Response Checklist
Appendix D1 - Table: Protective Measures to Reduce the Spread of Pandemic Influenza
Appendix D2 - Graded Implementation of Social Distancing Measures
Appendix D3 - Social Distancing Decision Making Protocol
Appendix E - Table: Decision Making for Social Distancing Measures, Risk Communications and Public Education
Appendix F - Threshold Determinants for the Use of Social Distancing Measures
Appendix G - PHSKC Avian Influenza Response Plan
I. INTRODUCTION

Seasonal influenza epidemics recur yearly due to subtypes of influenza that circulate worldwide. These epidemics are responsible for an average of 36,000 deaths annually in the United States. Seasonal influenza primarily impacts those in the community with weaker immune responses (the very young, old and chronically ill) since most people develop some degree of immunity to the viruses through annual illness or vaccine. This immune response helps protect from the serious consequences of influenza. Influenza pandemics, however, are distinct from seasonal influenza epidemics and represent one of the greatest potential threats to the public’s health. Pandemic influenza refers to a worldwide epidemic due to a new, dramatically different strain of influenza virus. A pandemic virus strain can spread rapidly from person to person and, if severe, can cause high levels of disease and death around the world.

Pandemic viruses develop in two main ways. First, wild birds are the reservoir for all influenza viruses. Most avian influenza viruses do not infect or cause significant disease in humans. However, new pandemic influenza viruses can arise when avian influenza viruses acquire the ability to infect and cause disease in humans, and then spread rapidly from person to person. Second, all influenza viruses experience frequent, slight changes to their genetic structure over time. This necessitates a change in annual vaccines to protect against seasonal influenza. Occasionally, however, influenza viruses undergo a major change in genetic composition through the combination of an avian and human virus.

The creation of a novel virus means that most, if not all, people in the world will have never been exposed to the new strain and have no immunity to the disease. It also means that new vaccines must be developed and therefore are not likely to be available for months, during which time many people could become infected and seriously ill.

During the 20th century, three pandemics occurred that spread worldwide within a year. The influenza pandemic of 1918 was especially virulent, killing a large number of young, otherwise healthy adults. It is now known that this pandemic was caused by an avian influenza virus that suddenly developed the ability to infect humans and to easily spread from person to person. The pandemic caused more than 500,000 deaths in the United States and more than 40 million deaths around the world. Subsequent pandemics in 1957-58 and 1968-69 caused far fewer fatalities in the U.S., 70,000 and 34,000 deaths respectively, but caused significant morbidity and mortality around the world. These two pandemics were caused by an influenza virus that arose from genetic reassortment between human and avian viruses.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) estimates that in the U.S. alone, an influenza pandemic could infect up to 200 million people and cause between 200,000 and 1,900,000 deaths. The worldwide public health and scientific community is increasingly concerned about the potential for a pandemic to arise.
from the widespread and growing avian influenza A (H5N1) outbreak across several continents. Although many officials believe it is inevitable that future influenza pandemics will occur, it is impossible to predict the exact timing of these outbreaks.

**Table 1.** Estimated number of Episodes of Illness, Healthcare Utilization, and Deaths Associated with Moderate and Severe Pandemic Influenza Scenarios for the US Population and King County $^{1, 2}$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Moderate (1958/68–like)</th>
<th>Severe (1918 – like)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US</td>
<td>King County</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illness</td>
<td>90 Million</td>
<td>540,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outpatient Care</td>
<td>45 million</td>
<td>270,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitalization</td>
<td>865,000</td>
<td>5,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICU Care</td>
<td>128,750</td>
<td>773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanical Ventilation</td>
<td>64,875</td>
<td>389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>209,000</td>
<td>1,254</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$^{1}$ Estimates are based on extrapolation from past pandemics in the US, and do not include the potential impacts of interventions not available during the 20th Century pandemics.

$^{2}$ The calculations used to determine the figures in Table one are based on the following assumptions:

- King County accounts for 0.6% of the total US population.
- Susceptibility to the pandemic influenza subtype will be universal.
- The clinical disease attack rate will be 30% in the overall population. Illness rates will be highest among school-aged children (about 40%) and decline with age. Among working adults, an average of 20% will become ill during a community outbreak.
- Of those who become ill with influenza, 50% will seek outpatient medical care.

There are several characteristics of an influenza pandemic that differentiate it from other public health emergencies. First, it has the potential to suddenly cause illness in a very large number of people, who could easily overwhelm the health care system throughout the nation. A pandemic outbreak could also jeopardize essential community services by causing high levels of absenteeism in critical positions in every workforce. It is likely that vaccines against the new virus will not be available for six to eight months following the emergence of the virus. Basic services, such as health care, law enforcement, fire, emergency response, communications, transportation, and utilities, could be disrupted during a pandemic. Finally, the pandemic, unlike many other emergency events, could last for several weeks, if not months.
Summary of Key Pandemic Preparedness and Response Principles Addressed in this Plan

**Develop countywide disease surveillance programs, coordinated with state and federal efforts, to detect pandemic influenza strains in humans and animals.**

i. Global surveillance networks identify circulating influenza strains, including novel strains that have the potential for causing a pandemic outbreaks among domestic animals and persons in several countries.

ii. A heightened local surveillance system, coupled with state, national and international surveillance efforts and laboratory testing, serves as an early warning system for potential pandemics and a critical component of pandemic response plans.

iii. Local surveillance during a pandemic outbreak provides important information regarding the severity of disease, characteristics of the affected population, and impacts on the health care system.

**Ensure mass vaccination plans and protocols are in place to rapidly administer vaccine and monitor vaccine effectiveness and safety.**

i. When a pandemic virus first emerges vaccine will not be available for six months or more.

ii. Demand for vaccine will significantly exceed supply during the pandemic, and may not be available at all for the first several months. Therefore, priority groups must be established by Public Health – Seattle & King County (PHSKC), based on national recommendations from the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and in collaboration with The Washington Department of Health, to provide guidance regarding the use of vaccine in King County when supplies become available. During a pandemic, however, PHSKC will consider national guidelines and local epidemiological data to adjust and finalize priority groups as necessary.

iii. As vaccine supplies increase, PHSKC will, in collaboration with the Health Care Coalition, coordinate with regional partners to vaccinate the entire county population.
iv. PHSKC in collaboration with Community Based Organizations will work to assure that residents best reached through non-traditional forms of communication will have access to vaccine information.

Establish guidelines for the utilization of antiviral medications by medical staff for treatment and prevention of influenza.

i. Antiviral medications can both prevent and treat influenza infection. Prophylaxis of individuals would need to continue throughout the period of exposure, possibly weeks to months. Treatment can decrease the severity of illness and resulting complications of infection. For optimal impact, treatment needs to be started as soon as possible and within 48 hours of the onset of illness.

ii. The current supply of influenza antiviral medications is extremely limited and production cannot be rapidly expanded.

iii. Educating physicians, nurses, and other health care workers before and during the pandemic on the appropriate use of antiviral drugs will be important to maximize the effective use of antiviral medications.

iv. Local protocols for prioritizing the use of antiviral medicines will be developed by PHSKC in consultation with the Washington Department of Health, and will be based on federal guidelines from the Centers for Disease Control (CDC).

Develop capabilities to implement non-medical measures to decrease the spread of disease throughout King County as guided by the epidemiology of the pandemic.

i. Emphasizing infection control measures in health care facilities, including hospitals, out-patient care settings and long-term care facilities, as well as workplaces, other community settings and the home can limit the spread of influenza among high-risk populations and health care workers.

ii. Voluntary isolation of ill persons either in a health care facility or at home is an infection control measure that will be implemented throughout all stages of a pandemic.

iii. Due to the fact that influenza is highly infectious and can be transmitted by people who appear to be well, quarantine of exposed individuals is likely to be a viable strategy for preventing the spread of the disease in the community only during the first stages of a pandemic.

iv. Social distancing measures such as limiting public gatherings and closing schools, colleges, universities, large child care centers, libraries, houses of worship, stadiums, and recreational facilities are intended to decrease
opportunities for close contact among persons in the community, thereby
decreasing the potential for influenza transmission among people and
possibly slowing the spread of a pandemic. Decisions makers must consider
the scope of their legal authorities, social and economic impacts, anticipated
effectiveness and current epidemiology of the pandemic prior to
implementing these measures.

v. During a pandemic, Public Health may recommend that people use public
transportation only for essential travel, or use alternative means of
transportation if available. There is no intention to restrict or close public
transportation systems, other than partial service reductions necessary due
to a potential shortage of drivers or limitations on fuel supply.

vi. PHSKC will work in collaboration with the Healthcare for the Homeless
Network (HCHN) to assure planning includes strategies to reduce the spread
of illness in congregate settings serving homeless persons where challenges
to social distancing exist.

Assist local health care system partners, response agencies, elected
leaders, the business community, and community based organizations with
pandemic preparedness planning aimed at maintaining the provision of
health care services, sustaining essential community services, and limiting
the spread of disease throughout the duration of a pandemic.

i. An influenza pandemic will place a substantial burden on inpatient and
outpatient health care services. Demands for medical supplies, equipment,
and hospital beds may exceed available resources for several weeks.

ii. Strategies to increase hospital bed availability during a pandemic include
deferring elective procedures, implementing more stringent criteria for
hospital admission, earlier discharge of patients with follow-up by home
health care personnel, and establishing alternate care facilities in non-
traditional sites.

iii. As demands for health care resources and services increase sharply, illness
and absenteeism among health care workers will further strain the ability to
provide quality care.

iv. Absenteeism during a pandemic among critical infrastructure agencies, first
response agencies, businesses, and community based organizations must be
accounted for in business continuity plans.

v. Training and technical support will be provided by PHSKC and others
agencies to Community Based Organizations serving vulnerable populations
to help assure they are able to sustain their critical services and assist the
clients they serve in their preparedness efforts.
Communicate with and educate the public, health care providers, local government and community leaders, and the media about the consequences of influenza pandemic and what each person can do to prepare.

i. Influencing public behavior toward basic infection control measures (hand washing, using alcohol hand gel, respiratory etiquette, staying home when sick, and avoiding unnecessary contact with other persons during a pandemic) will be a key factor in limiting the spread of influenza during a pandemic.

ii. Communicating clear, concise and accurate information about influenza, the course of the pandemic, and response activities will increase awareness, limit public panic and speculation, and sustain confidence in the public health system.
II. PURPOSE OF THE PLAN

The Pandemic Influenza Response Plan for King County (Plan) provides guidance to Public Health – Seattle and King County (PHSKC) and regional partners regarding detection, response and recovery from an influenza pandemic. The Plan describes the unique challenges posed by a pandemic that may necessitate specific leadership decisions, response actions, and communications mechanisms. Specifically, the purpose of the plan is to:

• Define preparedness activities that should be undertaken before a pandemic occurs that will enhance the effectiveness of response measures.

• Describe the response, coordination and decision making structure that will incorporate PHSKC, the health care system in King County, other local response agencies, and state and federal agencies during a pandemic.

• Define roles and responsibilities for PHSKC, local health care partners and local response agencies during all phases of a pandemic.

• Describe public health interventions in a pandemic response and the timing of such interventions.

• Serve as a guide for local health care system partners, response agencies and businesses in the development of pandemic influenza response plans.

• Provide technical support and information on which preparedness and response actions are based.

During an influenza pandemic, PHSKC and regional partners will utilize the plan to achieve the following goals:

→ Limit the number of illnesses and deaths

→ Preserve continuity of essential functions (government and business)

→ Minimize social disruption

→ Minimize economic losses

The plan will be coordinated with other PHSKC preparedness plans and activities, and will be coordinated with the plans of community, state and federal partners.
III. SCOPE OF THE PLAN

The Plan is an annex to Emergency Support Function 8 (Health and Medical Services) of the Regional Disaster Plan. Emergency Support Function 8 and its annexes are referenced in the Plan as they provide a broad description of the responsibilities, authorities, and actions associated with public health emergencies.

The Plan primarily focuses on the roles, responsibilities, and activities of PHSKC. However, specific responsibilities for key response partners are included to highlight points of coordination between agencies during an influenza pandemic. It is expected that health care facilities and health care professionals, essential service providers, local government officials, and business leaders will develop and incorporate procedures and protocols addressing influenza preparedness and response activities into their emergency response plans.

This plan also addresses measures that would be taken to contain an outbreak of the avian influenza virus in birds or other animal populations occurring in King County. Federal and state departments of agriculture are primarily responsible for surveillance and control of influenza outbreaks in domestic animals, although agricultural control measures interface with public health actions to prevent transmission into humans. Appendix G to this plan identifies the roles and responsibilities of local, state and federal agencies in response to an avian influenza threat to King County.
IV. PLANNING ASSUMPTIONS

1. An influenza pandemic will result in the rapid spread of the infection with outbreaks throughout the world. Communities across the state and the country may be impacted simultaneously.

2. There will be a need for heightened global, national and local surveillance.

3. Birds with an avian influenza strain may arrive and cause avian outbreaks in King County prior to the onset of a pandemic, significantly impacting domestic poultry, wild and exotic birds, and other species [Note: Response protocols for avian influenza outbreaks are contained in Appendix G of this plan].

4. King County will not be able to rely on mutual aid resources, State or Federal assistance to support local response efforts.

5. Antiviral medications will be in extremely short supply. Local supplies of antiviral medications may be prioritized by PHSKC for use in hospitalized influenza patients, health care workers providing care for patients, and other priority groups based on current national guidelines and in consultation with the Washington Department of Health (DOH).

6. A vaccine for the pandemic influenza strain will likely not be available for 6 to 8 months following the emergence of a novel virus.
   a. As vaccine becomes available, it will be distributed and administered by PHSKC based on current national guidelines and in consultation with the Washington DOH.
   b. Insufficient supplies of vaccines and antiviral medicines will place greater emphasis on social distancing strategies and public education to control the spread of the disease in the county.

7. The number of ill people requiring outpatient medical care and hospitalization could overwhelm the local health care system.
   a. Hospitals and clinics will have to modify their operational structure to respond to high patient volumes and maintain functionality of critical systems.
   b. The health care system may have to respond to increased demands for service while the medical workforce experiences 25-35% absenteeism due to illness.
   c. Demand for inpatient beds and assisted ventilators will increase by 25% or more, and prioritization criteria for access to limited services and resources may be needed.
d. There will be tremendous demand for urgent medical care services.

e. Infection control measures specific to management of influenza patients will need to be developed and implemented at health care facilities, out-patient care settings and long-term care facilities.

f. The health care system may need to develop alternative care sites (designated “flu triage clinics”) to relieve demand on hospital emergency rooms and care for persons not ill enough to merit hospitalization but who cannot be cared for at home.

g. Emergency Medical Service responders will face extremely high call volumes for several weeks, and may face 25% - 35% reduction in available staff.

h. The number of fatalities experienced during the first few weeks of a pandemic could overwhelm the resources of the Medical Examiner’s Office, hospital morgues, and funeral homes.

i. The demand for home care and social services will increase dramatically.

8. There could be significant disruption of public and privately owned critical infrastructure including transportation, commerce, utilities, public safety, agriculture and communications.

9. Social distancing strategies aimed at reducing the spread of infection such as closing schools, community centers, and other public gather points and canceling public events may be implemented during a pandemic.

10. Some persons will be unable or unwilling to comply with isolation directives. For others, social distancing strategies may be less feasible (for example, homeless populations who live or are sheltered in congregate settings). It will be important to develop and disseminate strategies for infection control appropriate for these environments and populations.

11. It will be important to coordinate pandemic response strategies throughout counties in the Puget Sound area and the State due to the regional mobility of the population.

12. The general public, health care system, response agencies, and elected leaders will need continuous updates on the status of the pandemic outbreak, impacts on critical services, the steps PHSKC is taking to address the incident, and steps response partners and the public can take to protect themselves.
V. AUTHORITIES

Various state and local public officials have overlapping authorities with regard to protecting public health and safety. The Governor, the State Board of Health, the State Secretary of Health, the County Executive, the local Board of Health, the executive heads of cities and towns, and the Local Health Officer each can implement authorities within the scope of their jurisdiction aimed at protecting public health, including increasing social distancing by closing public or private facilities. During a pandemic, the presence of overlapping authorities will necessitate close communication and coordination between elected leaders and the Local Health Officer to ensure decisions and response actions are clear and consistent.

1. Governor of Washington State

The Governor has authority to proclaim a state of emergency after finding that a disaster affects life, health, property, or the public peace. RCW 43.06.010(12). The Governor may assume direct operational control over all or part of local emergency management functions if the disaster is beyond local control. RCW 38.52.050. After proclaiming a state of emergency, the Governor has the authority to restrict public assembly, order periods of curfew, and prohibit activities that he or she believes should be prohibited in order to maintain life and health. RCW 43.06.220.

2. State Board of Health

The State Board of Health has authority to adopt rules to protect the public health, including rules for the imposition and use of isolation and quarantine and for the prevention and control of infectious diseases. RCW 43.20.050(2). Local boards of health, health officials, law enforcement officials, and all other officers of the state or any county, city, or town shall enforce all rules that are adopted by the State Board of Health. RCW 43.20.050(4).

3. The State Secretary of Health

The Secretary of Health shall enforce all laws for the protection of the public health, and all rules, regulations, and orders of the State Board of Health. RCW 43.70.130(3). The Secretary also shall investigate outbreaks and epidemics of disease and advise Local Health Officers about measures to prevent and control outbreaks. RCW 43.70.130(5). The Secretary shall enforce public health laws, rules, regulations, and orders in local matters when there is an emergency and the local board of health has failed to act with sufficient promptness or efficiency, or is unable to act for reasons beyond its control. RCW 43.70.130(4). The Secretary has the same authority as local health officers but will not exercise that authority unless: (a) the Local Health Officer fails or is unable to do so; (b) by agreement with
the Local Health Officer or local board of health; or (c) when in an emergency
the safety of the public health demands it. RCW 43.70.130(7).

4. King County Executive

The King County Executive may proclaim a state of emergency within the
County when, in the judgment of the Executive, extraordinary measures are
necessary to protect public peace, safety and welfare K.C.C. 12.52.030.A.
Under a state of emergency, the Executive may impose curfews, close any or
all private businesses, close any or all public buildings and places including
streets, alleys, schools, parks, beaches and amusement areas, and proclaim
any such orders as are imminently necessary for the protection of life and
property K.C.C. 12.52.030.B.

5. King County Board of Health

The jurisdiction of local Board of Health is coextensive with the boundaries of
the county. RCW 70.05.035. The local Board of Health shall supervise all
matters pertaining to the preservation of the life and health of the people
within its jurisdiction. RCW 70.05.060. The Board shall enforce through the
Local Health Officer the public health statutes of the state and the rules
promulgated by the State Board of Health and the Secretary of Health. RCW
70.05.060(1). The Board may also enact such local rules and regulations as are
necessary to preserve and promote the public health and to provide the
enforcement of those rules and regulations. RCW 70.05.060(3).

6. Mayor of Seattle

The Mayor of Seattle may proclaim a state of civil emergency within the City
when, in the judgment of the Mayor, extraordinary measures are necessary
to protect public peace, safety and welfare. SMC 10.02.010.A. Under a state
of civil emergency, the Mayor may impose curfews, close any or all business
establishments, close any or all public buildings and places including streets,
alleys, schools, parks, beaches and amusement areas, direct the use of all
public and private health, medical and convalescent facilities and equipment
to provide emergency health and medical care for injured persons, and
proclaim any such orders as are imminently necessary for the protection of
life and property. SMC 10.02.020.

7. Suburban City Executive Heads

Each political subdivision is authorized to exercise emergency functions.
RCW 38.52.070. Suburban cities throughout King County may have explicit
emergency powers and authorities in their municipal codes.
8. Local Health Officer

The Local Health Officer acts under the direction of the local Board of Health. RCW 70.05.070. The Local Health Officer enforces the public health statutes, rules and regulations of the state and the local Board of Health. RCW 70.05.070(1). The Local Health Officer has the authority to control and prevent the spread of any dangerous, contagious or infectious diseases that may occur within his or her jurisdiction. RCW 70.05.070(3).

The Local Health Officer shall, when necessary, conduct investigations and institute disease control measures, including medical examination, testing, counseling, treatment, vaccination, decontamination of persons or animals, isolation, quarantine, and inspection and closure of facilities. WAC 246-100-036(3). The Local Health Officer may initiate involuntary detention for isolation and quarantine of individuals or groups pursuant to provisions of state regulations. WAC 246-100-040 through -070.

The Local Health Officer has the authority to carry out steps needed to verify a diagnosis reported by a health care provider, and to require any person suspected of having a reportable disease or condition to submit to examinations to determine the presence of the disease. The Local Health Officer may also investigate any suspected case of a reportable disease or other condition if necessary, and require notification of additional conditions of public health importance occurring within the jurisdiction. WAC 246-101-505(11).

The Local Health Officer shall establish, in consultation with local health care providers, health facilities, emergency management personnel, law enforcement agencies, and other entities deemed necessary, plans, policies, and procedures for instituting emergency measures to prevent the spread of communicable disease. WAC 246-100-036(1).

The Local Health Officer may take all necessary actions to protect the public health in the event of a contagious disease occurring in a school or day care center. Those actions may include, but are not limited to, closing the affected school, closing other schools, ordering cessation of certain activities, and excluding persons who are infected with the disease. WAC 246-110-020(1). Prior to taking action, the Local Health Officer shall consult with the State Secretary of Health, the superintendent of the school district or the chief administrator of the day care center, and provide them and their board of directors a written decision directing them to take action. WAC 246-110-020 (2).

The Local Health Officer’s powers are not contingent on a proclamation of emergency by the county Executive or an executive head of a city or town.
VI. PHASES OF A PANDEMIC

The World Health Organization (WHO) has developed a global influenza preparedness plan that includes a classification system for guiding planning and response activities for an influenza pandemic. This classification system is comprised of six phases of increasing public health risk associated with the emergence and spread of a new influenza virus subtype that may lead to a pandemic. The Director General of WHO formally declares the current global pandemic phase and adjusts the phase level to correspond with pandemic conditions around the world. For each phase, the global influenza preparedness plan identifies response measures WHO will take, and recommends actions that countries around the world should implement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pandemic Phases</th>
<th>Public Health Goals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interpandemic Period</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase 1</strong> – No new influenza virus subtypes detected in humans. An influenza virus subtype that has caused human infection may be present in animals. If present in animals, the risk of human infection or disease is considered low.</td>
<td>Strengthen influenza pandemic preparedness at all levels. Closely monitor human and animal surveillance data.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase 2</strong> – No new influenza virus subtypes detected in humans. However, a circulating animal influenza virus subtype poses substantial risk of human disease.</td>
<td>Minimize the risk of transmission of animal influenza virus to humans; detect and report such transmission rapidly if it occurs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pandemic Alert Period</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase 3</strong> – Human infection(s) are occurring with a new subtype, but no human-to-human spread, or at most rare instances of spread to a close contact.</td>
<td>Ensure rapid characterization of the new virus subtype and early detection, notification and response to additional cases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase 4</strong> – Small cluster(s) of human infection with limited human-to-human transmission but spread is highly localized suggesting that the virus is not well adapted to humans.</td>
<td>Contain the new virus within limited foci or delay spread to gain time to implement preparedness measures, including vaccine development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase 5</strong> – Larger cluster(s) of human infection but human-to-human spread is localized, suggesting that the virus is becoming increasingly better adapted to humans, but may not yet be fully transmissible (substantial pandemic risk).</td>
<td>Maximize efforts to contain or delay spread to possibly avert a pandemic, and to gain time to implement response measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pandemic Period</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase 6</strong> – Pandemic is declared. Increased and sustained transmission in the general population.</td>
<td>Implement response measures including social distancing to minimize pandemic impacts.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In accordance with the Department of Health and Human Services Pandemic Influenza Strategic Plan, HHS will determine and communicate the pandemic phase level for the U.S. based on the global pandemic phase and the extent of disease spread throughout the country.

The King County Pandemic Influenza Response Plan corresponds to the WHO pandemic phases. Each phase within the Plan is subdivided into two components, “affected” and “not affected” depending upon whether human infection is occurring within the local region. Appropriate preparedness and response measures are identified for each phase, with implementation based in part on whether King County is affected.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pandemic Phases</th>
<th>Sub Phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase 1</strong></td>
<td>No sub phases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase 2</strong></td>
<td>A. Local area is affected or has extensive travel / trade links with affected areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Not affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase 3</strong></td>
<td>A. Local area is affected or has extensive travel / trade links with affected areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Not affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase 4</strong></td>
<td>A. Local area is affected or has extensive travel / trade links with affected areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Not affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase 5</strong></td>
<td>A. Local area is affected or has extensive travel / trade links with affected areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Not affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase 6</strong></td>
<td>A. Not yet affected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Local area is affected or has extensive travel / trade links with affected areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Subsided</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D. Next wave</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
VII. RESPONSIBILITIES

Public Health Seattle & King County (PHSKC)

1. Facilitate countywide pandemic planning and preparedness efforts.

2. Coordinate the community’s emergency public health response through Emergency Support Function 8 (Health and Medical Services), and the Regional Disaster Plan.

3. Educate the public, health care system partners, response partners, businesses, community based organizations and elected leaders about influenza pandemics, expected impacts and consequences, and preventive measures.

4. Provide training and technical support to local agencies, Community Based Organizations, and government entities serving vulnerable populations to assist their preparedness planning.

5. Conduct county-wide surveillance to track the spread of the human disease and its impact on the community. Through liaison with agriculture and wildlife agencies, facilitate influenza surveillance in animals in King County and monitor surveillance data.

6. Identify and declare diseases of public health significance, and communicate such declarations to health system partners.

7. Coordinate planning for and implementation of disease containment strategies and authorities.

8. Provide ongoing technical support to the health care system including current surveillance guidelines, recommendations for clinical case management, infection control measures and laboratory testing.

9. Support the health care system’s planning and response efforts for medical surge capacity including mass casualty and mass fatality incidents.

10. Support the development and management of local antiviral medication stockpiles.

11. Develop and implement protocols for the use of limited supplies of influenza vaccine and antiviral medicines consistent with national guidelines and in consultation with the Washington DOH.

12. Direct distribution and administration of vaccine, including mass vaccination efforts.
13. Provide effective communications to the public, the media, elected officials, health care providers, business and community leaders throughout public health emergencies.

**Local Hospitals, Clinics, Providers and other Health System Partners**

1. Health care system partners will participate in a Health Care Coalition facilitated by PHSKC to maximize the health care system’s ability to provide medical care during a pandemic. Specific steps include:
   
a. Identify and prioritize response issues affecting the county-wide health system during a pandemic.
   
b. Develop mechanisms to efficiently share information and resources between health system partners, and to communicate with PHSKC and relevant emergency operations centers, as appropriate.
   
c. Coordinate with the Local Health Officer regarding policy level decisions regarding the operations of the local health system.
   
d. Assure that health care professionals receive relevant communications from PHSKC in a timely manner.

2. Hospitals and other health care facilities will develop pandemic response plans consistent with the health care planning guidance contained in the Health and Human Services Pandemic Influenza Plan. Health care facility pandemic response plans will address medical surge capacity to sustain health care delivery capabilities when routine systems are overwhelmed.

3. Health care facilities and health care providers will participate in local influenza surveillance activities.

4. Hospitals will develop infection control plans to triage and isolate infectious patients and protect staff from disease transmission.

**State Department of Health (DOH)**

1. Coordinate statewide pandemic planning and preparedness efforts.

2. Coordinate statewide surveillance activities.

3. Operate a CDC Laboratory Response Network public health reference laboratory for novel influenza virus testing.
4. Coordinate submission of pandemic epidemiological data to CDC and dissemination of statewide data and situation updates to local health jurisdictions.

5. Coordinate development and implementation of disease containment strategies across multiple counties and regions within the state.

6. Provide state assistance, when available, and request federal assistance to support the local health and medical response.

7. Receive antiviral medicines and other medical supplies from the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) and immediately deploy these supplies to local health departments based on population.

8. Educate and inform the public on the course of the pandemic and preventive measures.

Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)

1. Provide overall guidance on pandemic influenza planning within the United States.

2. Coordinate the national response to an influenza pandemic.

3. Provide guidance and tools to promote pandemic preparedness planning and coordination for States and local jurisdictions.

4. Provide guidance to state and local health departments regarding prioritization of limited supplies of antiviral medications and vaccines.

5. Determine and communicate the pandemic phase for the U.S. based on the global pandemic phase (established by WHO) and the extent of disease spread throughout the country.

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)

1. Conduct national and international disease surveillance.

2. Serve as a liaison to the WHO.

3. Develop reference strains for vaccines and conduct research to understand transmission and pathogenicity of viruses with pandemic potential.


5. Support vaccination programs; monitor vaccine safety.

6. Investigate pandemic outbreaks; define the epidemiology of the disease.
7. Monitor the nation-wide impact of a pandemic.

8. Coordinate the stockpiling of antiviral drugs and other essential materials within the Strategic National Stockpile.

9. **Activate the SNS when the WHO raises the Global Pandemic Alert Level to Phase 4 and deploy antiviral supplies to each state.**

10. Coordinate the implementation of international – U.S. travel restrictions.

11. Under federal authority, implement isolation, quarantine and social distancing measures on tribal lands, as needed.

**World Health Organization**

1. Monitor global pandemic conditions and provide information updates.

2. Facilitate enhanced global pandemic preparedness, surveillance, vaccine development, and health response.

3. Declare global pandemic phase and adjust phases based on current outbreak conditions.
Specific Responsibilities of PHSKC Divisions and Sections

**Director and Local Health Officer (Local Health Officer)**
- Communicate and coordinate directly with the King County Executive, executive heads of cities and towns, Local Board of Health, and the Health Care Coalition regarding pandemic preparedness and response activities.

- Coordinate directly with Health Care Coalition partners and make decisions regarding strategies, thresholds and methods for reallocating resources and temporary restructuring of health system operations in response to a pandemic.

- Authorize and communicate public health directives regarding social distancing strategies and other protective actions to elected leaders, the business community, schools, the health care coalition and other partners.

- Assign responsibilities to PHSKC staff for planning and responding to the pandemic.

- Ensure business continuity of critical PHSKC functions during all phases of the pandemic.

- Direct isolation and quarantine of individuals and groups, as needed, based on recommendations from the Chief, Communicable Disease Control Section.

**Public Information Officer (PIO)**
- Provide accurate, timely information to the public regarding preparations for a pandemic, the impacts of the outbreak, local response actions and disease control recommendations.

- Educate the public on how they can protect themselves from becoming infected and infecting others.

- Activate and direct the management of public information call centers focused on providing health information to the public.

**Communicable Disease Control, Epidemiology and Immunization Section**
- Carry out countywide surveillance, epidemiological investigation and disease control activities.

- Provide information and technical support on surveillance, epidemiology and clinical issues, including case identification,
laboratory testing, management, and infection control to health care providers and facilities.

- Make decisions regarding the need for individual and group isolation and quarantine.

- Work with the PHSKC PIO to develop and disseminate risk communications messages to the public.

- Provide recommendations to the Local Health Officer regarding measures to sustain the functionality of the local health care system.

- Advise the Local Health Officer regarding the need for and potential consequences of social distancing measures.

- Coordinate receipt of vaccines in conjunction with the Chief of Pharmacy, and develop strategies for storage, distribution and allocation of vaccines among health care system partners.

- Develop protocols for prioritizing limited supplies of antiviral medicines and vaccines in King County.

**Preparedness Section**

- Lead pandemic planning and preparedness efforts for PHSKC in conjunction with local, state and federal response partners.

- Conduct training, drills and evaluated exercises to enhance PHSKC’s readiness to respond to a pandemic.

- Coordinate planning and response activities with hospitals and community health clinics in collaboration with the Health Care Coalition, Communicable Disease Section and Community Health Services Division.

- Coordinate activation and management of the PHSKC Emergency Operations Center.

- Advise the Local Health Officer regarding the potential social and economic impacts of social distancing measures, and the extent to which implementation of such measures is feasible.

- Coordinate department-wide business continuity efforts specific to the potential impacts of a pandemic.
**Vulnerable Populations Action Team**
- Provide culturally appropriate technical assistance and training to local agencies, Community Based Organizations, and large informal networks serving vulnerable populations.

**Community Health Services Division**
- Participate in planning activities focused to develop capacity for community-based influenza evaluation and treatment clinics.
- Lead and coordinate all mass vaccination response activities.
- Lead efforts with community partners to manage a client care call center (Isolation and Quarantine Response Center).
- Develop infection control plans for PHSKC sites, with technical assistance from the Communicable Disease Control Section, to protect staff and clients.
- The Health Care for the Homeless Section, with assistance from the Vulnerable Populations Action Team, will help coordinate countywide pandemic planning, education and outreach efforts with homeless service agencies.
- Provide technical assistance to licensed child care centers regarding preparedness for pandemic influenza.

**Community Based Public Health Practice**
- Coordinate countywide pandemic planning, education and outreach efforts with:
  - School systems
  - Business community
  - Community based organizations
- Coordinate with economic development agencies and chambers of commerce regarding the economic consequences of a pandemic

**Medical Examiner’s Office**
- Lead mass fatality planning and response efforts.
- Coordinate with and support hospitals regarding mass fatalities planning and response.
- Incorporate funeral home directors into planning efforts for pandemic response.
• In conjunction with community partners, coordinate planning and development of victim assistance centers.

**Emergency Medical Services Division**

• Facilitate pandemic planning and response activities with countywide EMS providers, 911 dispatch centers and Hospital Control (Harborview Hospital).

• Develop protocols for maintaining critical EMS response capability during a pandemic generating high call volumes and reducing available EMS resources.

**Environmental Health Services Division [See Appendix G]**

• Assist in surveillance for animal influenza viruses through liaison with the State Departments of Agriculture and Fish & Wildlife.

• Work with the PHSKC PIO to develop and disseminate risk communications messages to the public concerning zoonotic influenza virus transmission, food safety, and animal waste disposal issues.

**All Divisions and Sections**

• Identify mission critical functions that must be maintained during all hazards including a pandemic.

• Identify staff who can be cross trained to perform emergency response functions

• Identify functions that could be temporarily discontinued or performed via telecommuting for several weeks.

• Be prepared to mobilize all necessary staff to support the PHSKC pandemic influenza response, as directed by the PHSKC Incident Commander.
VIII. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A. Overview

1. PHSKC will facilitate the development of a Health Care Coalition in King County with representatives from hospitals, out-patient medical groups, private physicians, emergency medical providers, mental health providers, long-term care facilities, home health agencies, and pharmacists. The Coalition will develop strategies for:

   a. Coordinating the health care system response during a pandemic and other public health emergencies;

   b. Assuring the most effective use of available health care system resources during health emergencies; and

   c. Advising the Local Health Officer regarding the impacts of the pandemic on the health care system, on the need for changes in health care system operations to respond to the pandemic, and on strategies to implement necessary changes.

2. PHSKC will authorize the acquisition of state or federal medical resources in support of health care system partners.

3. PHSKC will coordinate response actions with the Washington DOH and neighboring local health jurisdictions.

4. PHSKC’s response actions will emphasize disease surveillance and investigation, social distancing measures to reduce the spread of infection, and providing frequent communication and education to the public about the pandemic, the public health response, and steps the public can take to reduce the risks of infection.

5. Throughout a pandemic, the PHSKC Chief of Health Operations, Chief of the Communicable Disease Control Section, Director of Public Health Preparedness, Public Health Veterinarian and the Public Information Officer will advise the Local Health Officer regarding public health response activities, social distancing measures and management of PHSKC resources.

B. Direction and Control

1. The public health response will be managed per the guidance and protocols included in this Plan and ESF 8 of the Regional Disaster Plan.

2. PHSKC and all response partners will operate under the Incident Command System throughout the duration of the pandemic response.
3. PHSKC will activate the Public Health Emergency Operations Center to coordinate the countywide public health and medical response during a pandemic.

4. King County, Seattle, and other cities may activate their EOCs during a pandemic to coordinate consequence response.

5. During Pandemic Phases 1, 2 and 3 where King County is not directly affected, PHSKC leads health system preparedness efforts and countywide education efforts for pandemic response.

6. During Pandemic Phases 4, 5 and 6, PHSKC will coordinate with Health Care Coalition partners to establish and implement Unified Command as the operational structure for directing and managing health care system resources and information.

7. PHSKC will assess the viability of social distancing measures and establish criteria for their implementation.

8. Upon reaching Pandemic Phase 4 (global) PHSKC will:
   a. Activate the King County Pandemic Influenza Response Plan and ESF 8 under Unified Command to coordinate the health care system response.
   b. Provide regular briefings to the King County Executive, the Mayor of Seattle, other local elected officials, and regional response partners. Briefings will address the nature of the disease, its communicability and virulence, availability of vaccines and antivirals, actions that are being taken to minimize the impact, actions that response partners should implement to protect critical functions, and health information being shared with the public and health care providers.

C. Communications

1. PHSKC serves as the lead agency in King County for risk communications messaging and public education regarding pandemic influenza. All King County jurisdictions will coordinate with PHSKC to ensure consistency of communications and education messaging regarding pandemic influenza.

2. Communications with the public and health care providers will be a critical component of the pandemic response, including managing the utilization of health care services. This plan’s communications goals are to:
   a. Provide accurate, consistent, and comprehensive information about pandemic influenza including case definitions, treatment options, infection control measures, and reporting requirements.
b. Instill and maintain public confidence in the County’s public health and health care systems and their ability to respond to and manage an influenza pandemic.

c. Ensure an efficient mechanism for managing information between PHSKC, health system partners and response agencies.

d. Contribute to maintaining order, minimizing public panic and fear, and facilitating public compliance by providing accurate, rapid, and complete information.

e. Address rumors, inaccuracies, and misperceptions as quickly as possible, and prevent the stigmatization of affected groups.

3. Communications During Pandemic Phases 1, 2, 3

a. The PHSKC Communications Section:

i. Assesses the information needs of health care providers.

ii. Assesses the information needs of the general public.

iii. Identifies any logistical constraints to effective communications, such as communications staffing and equipment needs, and public information call center staffing and capacity.

iv. Intensifies public education efforts about influenza pandemics, animal influenza and steps that can be taken to reduce exposure to infection. Information may be disseminated via web site postings, newspaper editorials, flyers and billboards, television and radio broadcasts.

v. Coordinates with CDC, the Washington DOH, and health departments in adjacent jurisdictions to develop common health messages and education materials.

b. The Communicable Disease, Preparedness and Community Based Public Health Practice Sections educates providers, public officials, businesses and emergency responders about influenza pandemics and steps they should take to plan for pandemic outbreaks.

c. The PHSKC Medical Director will convene appropriate internal sections and Divisions to develop a communications strategy for vulnerable populations including identifying appropriate community partners for reaching and educating diverse communities such as limited English speaking and homeless citizens.
d. The Vulnerable Populations Action Team will assist the efforts of the PHSKC PIO in assuring this information reaches agencies serving vulnerable populations.

4. Communications During Phases 4, 5, 6

a. PHSKC Public Information Officer (PIO) will evaluate the need to establish a Joint Information Center (JIC) in conjunction with appropriate health system and response partners. A JIC will be activated in support of the Unified Command when the PHSKC PIO deems it necessary based on specific characteristics of the pandemic.

b. The PHSKC PIO will evaluate the need to establish a public information call center to respond to public inquiries.

c. The PHSKC PIO will work with the Health Care Coalition and the Communicable Disease Section to develop public information messages related to the utilization of the health care system and other resources (triage centers, call centers, etc).

d. The Communicable Disease Section will initiate regular communication briefings with hospital emergency rooms, infection control practitioners, infectious disease specialists, and community providers as necessary and in collaboration with the Health Care Coalition. The Section will also regularly communicate with experts at the CDC and the Washington DOH.

e. The Preparedness and Community Based Public Health Practice Sections will conduct regular briefings with key response partners, utilizing the emergency zone structure, to inform EOC staff, business leaders, community based organizations, first response agencies, schools and critical infrastructure agencies on the status of the pandemic and local response actions.

f. As the pandemic expands, the PHSKC PIO will provide daily updates on the pandemic and will organize regular media briefings.

g. The PHSKC PIO will keep the public informed about steps that should be taken to protect against infection, treatment options for individuals who are infected, the status of the spread of the outbreak in the community, and the disease control and containment strategies that are being implemented.
D. Mitigation

Mitigation activities are taken in advance of an influenza pandemic to prevent or temper its impact. Mitigation efforts should occur primarily during pandemic phases 1-3.

PHSKC’s pre-event mitigation activities include:

1. Planning, exercising, evaluating and revising the Pandemic Influenza Response Plan.

2. Training and equipping PHSKC staff to assure competencies and capacities needed to respond to a pandemic outbreak.

3. Developing strategic partnerships and facilitating capacity building with local hospitals, non-hospital-based health care providers and agencies, other health care system stakeholders, and local, state and federal response agencies and their staff.

4. Educating response partners, the media and public about the consequences of influenza pandemics and recommended preparedness measures.

5. Provide preparedness training and technical assistance to local agencies, Community Based Organizations and large informal networks serving vulnerable populations.

6. Informing and updating local elected officials about the potential impacts of an influenza pandemic on essential services and infrastructure in King County.

7. Stockpiling necessary medications and equipment that will be needed to respond to an influenza pandemic.

E. Surveillance

1. Influenza is not a mandated notifiable disease under Washington Administrative Code. During a pandemic response, the PHSKC Disease Control Officer in the Communicable Disease Section may declare the circulating strain of influenza causing the pandemic a Disease of Public Health Significance, requiring health care providers and laboratories to report cases.

2. As a pandemic outbreak progresses, the Communicable Disease Section will enhance existing surveillance efforts, including gathering relevant available clinical date (i.e. admission and discharge diagnosis) from
hospitals in the county and from selected large medical group practices, such as the University of Washington, Virginia Mason and Group Health.

3. Surveillance During Pandemic Phases 1, 2, 3

a. The Communicable Disease Section conducts daily influenza tracking activities [reports regarding school absenteeism, pneumonia and influenza deaths submitted by Vital Statistics, nursing home reports, homeless shelter reports and sentinel providers].

b. The Communicable Disease Section and Public Health Veterinarian coordinate surveillance activities with the disease control activities of the CDC, state agencies, and health departments in adjacent jurisdictions.

c. Syndromic surveillance data is collected and assessed [chief complaint and hospital admission and discharge data, when available, from King County hospitals, Emergency Medical Service dispatch data, and daily death reports from the Medical Examiner’s Office].

d. PHSKC works with clinicians, hospitals, and infectious disease specialists to enhance case detection, according to CDC screening criteria, among persons who have recently traveled to outbreak areas and present with illnesses meeting the clinical criteria for influenza.

e. PHSKC develops partnerships with key employers to track absenteeism in the event of a flu pandemic [City and county government, large employers].

f. PHSKC Laboratory supports the Washington DOH Laboratory in conducting influenza testing, as requested. The PHSKC Laboratory will not perform viral culture.

4. Surveillance During Pandemic Phases 4, 5, 6

g. PHSKC may require health care providers and institutions to report influenza and to send specimens from these cases to the State DOH Laboratory or the PHSKC Laboratory for testing, as requested.

h. Upon the WHO raising the Global Pandemic Alert Level to Phase 6, the State Secretary of Health will file an emergency rule making the pandemic strain of influenza an immediately notifiable condition by health care providers and laboratories.

i. PHSKC will inform community health care providers regarding recommendations for influenza laboratory testing based on consultation with Washington DOH and CDC.
j. The Communicable Disease Section will comply with CDC and Washington DOH guidelines to facilitate monitoring of the influenza pandemic strain for antiviral resistance.

k. The Communicable Disease Section will activate tracking of absenteeism with schools and certain sentinel employers, where feasible.

F. Public Education

1. Public education through all phases of a pandemic may involve any or all of the following elements:
   a. Dissemination of printed and web-based information in multiple languages.
   b. **Active outreach to traditionally underserved populations, in cooperation with community organizations and other local entities serving them.**
   c. Frequent use of radio, television and print media.
   d. Coordination with other health care providers and care-givers to ensure consistent messaging.
   e. Implementation of a public information call center.

2. Government agencies, businesses, schools, health care system partners, community based organizations and other agencies within King County will promote and disseminate pandemic influenza educational messages to their staff.

3. PHSKC leads efforts to strengthen support, outreach and training for vulnerable populations in King County. Specific actions include:
   a. Conduct needs assessments identifying types of resources and information vulnerable populations need during emergencies.
   b. **Provide training and job aids for community leaders, Community Based Organizations, medical interpreters and other local entities to serve as information conduits to vulnerable populations during emergencies.**
   c. Partner with cultural leaders and medical interpreters across the county to build sustainable preparedness capabilities within communities.
G. Vaccine and Antiviral Medications

1. Vaccine serves as the most effective preventive strategy against outbreaks of influenza, including pandemics. However, dissemination of an effective influenza vaccine during a pandemic faces several challenges:
   a. A pandemic strain could be detected at any time, and production of vaccine could take six to eight months after the virus first emerges.
   b. The target population for vaccination will ultimately include the entire U.S. population.
   c. It is expected that demand for vaccine will initially outstrip supply and administration of limited vaccine will need to be prioritized based on national guidelines and in consultation with the Washington DOH.
   d. It is likely that two doses of vaccine occurring two to four weeks apart will be required.

2. Antiviral medications may be useful for controlling and preventing influenza prior to the availability of vaccines. However, there is a limited supply of antiviral drugs effective against pandemic strains.

3. Vaccine Management During Phases 1, 2, 3
   a. The Communicable Disease Section, in consultation with Washington DOH and based on national guidelines, is developing and refining recommendations for use of available vaccine based on local priority groups, and include as Appendix A to this plan.
   b. The Mass Vaccination Work Group within PHSKC is developing plans for administration of vaccine to priority groups, and eventually the entire county population, including activation of mass vaccination clinics.
   c. The Communicable Disease Section is coordinating with Washington DOH to determine how adverse reactions to the vaccine will be tracked and reported.
   d. The Preparedness Section, Communicable Disease Section and Community Based Public Health Practice Section are collaborating with key stakeholders to identify essential personnel to be included in priority groups for vaccinations.
   e. The Mass Vaccination Work Group is coordinating vaccination planning with private sector health care providers.
4. Vaccine Management During Phases 4, 5, 6
   a. In consultation with Washington DOH, the Communicable Disease Section will provide updated recommendations to the Local Health Officer regarding priority groups to receive vaccination based on CDC guidelines.
   b. The Mass Vaccination Work Group will finalize mass vaccination plans with regional partners.
   c. The PHSKC Chief of Pharmacy, in collaboration with the Communicable Disease Section, will prepare to receive, store and transport vaccine as needed.
   d. PHSKC will distribute and administer vaccine as soon as possible after receipt according to local priorities and CDC guidelines, including activation of mass vaccination plans as appropriate.

5. Antiviral Medication Management During Phases 1, 2, 3
   a. The Communicable Disease Section is identifying priority groups and estimate the number of people in each priority group, based on CDC guidelines, to receive limited supplies of antiviral medications during a pandemic and include as Appendix B to this plan.
   b. The Local Health Officer is coordinating with appropriate health care system partners and elected leaders to form strategies for acquiring antiviral medications.
   c. The Preparedness Section is developing an antiviral medication distribution plan in conjunction with the Communicable Disease Section, the Mass Vaccination Work Group, and appropriate members of the Health Care Coalition.
   d. The Communicable Disease Section is developing and will distribute guidelines for medical providers regarding the use of antiviral medications.

6. Antiviral Medication Management During Phases 4, 5, 6
   a. The CDC will activate the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) when the World Health Organization raises the Global Pandemic Alert Level to Phase 4. At Phase 4, CDC will immediately distribute allocations of antiviral medications to each state.
   b. At Phase 4, DOH will immediately activate the Reception, Storage and Staging (RSS) facility and prepare to receive the state’s allocation of antiviral medications from the SNS.
c. DOH will immediately notify all local health departments to prepare to receive local allocations of SNS antiviral medications. Allocations will be disseminated to local health departments proportionally based on population.

d. At Phase 4, PHSKC will immediately activate the Public Health EOC and prepare to receive, store and redistribute SNS antiviral medications according to the PHSKC SNS Plan.

e. PHSKC will ensure that staff and resources are in place to distribute antiviral medications, as supplies allow.

f. PHSKC will activate its plans for requesting medications from the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS).

g. PHSKC will fully activate antiviral medication distribution plans.

H. Isolation and Quarantine

1. During all phases of a pandemic, persons ill with influenza will be directed to remain in isolation in health care settings or at home, to the extent possible.

2. For persons living or staying in congregate settings, sponsoring agencies will be assisted in exploring and planning for alternatives to isolation and quarantine aimed at reducing the rate and degree of influenza spread.

3. Hospitals will implement isolation protocols for all patients suspected of being infected with pandemic influenza.

4. Quarantine of contacts of influenza cases may be beneficial during the earliest phases of a pandemic, and in response to an influenza virus that has not achieved the ability to spread easily from person-to-person.

5. Once person-to-person transmission is established locally, quarantine of individuals exposed to influenza cases will be of limited value in preventing further spread of the disease.

6. PHSKC will work collaboratively with the CDC Division of Quarantine Station at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport and the Port of Seattle on management of passengers requiring isolation, quarantine or follow-up.

7. The CDC will be the lead agency regarding recognition and management of ill and exposed travelers, including quarantine of exposed persons and isolation of ill persons, entering the country at ports of entry. CDC will not request local staff resources to support screening of travelers at ports of entry or quarantine of exposed passengers.
8. Isolation and Quarantine During Phases 1, 2, 3
   a. The Preparedness Section is coordinating planning efforts for isolation and quarantine with Washington DOH, neighboring local health jurisdictions, community based organizations and local law enforcement.
   b. PHSKC is following CDC guidelines in developing and implementing isolation and quarantine procedures for individuals traveling from areas in which a novel influenza virus is present.

9. Isolation and Quarantine During Phases 4, 5, 6
   a. The Communicable Disease Section will coordinate with health care providers and hospitals to ensure that influenza patients are isolated in appropriate facilities based on their medical condition (homes, hospital, alternate care facility).
   b. The Communicable Disease Section will develop protocols for quarantine of close contacts of persons infected with a potential pandemic strain.
   c. The Communicable Disease Section will provide technical assistance to health care providers and hospitals regarding options for management of health care workers who come in contact with influenza patients or who develop influenza.
   d. The PHSKC Isolation and Quarantine Response Plan will be activated as needed to ensure availability of isolation and quarantine facilities and support systems for patients.

I. Social Distancing Strategies

1. Social distancing strategies are non-medical measures intended to reduce the spread of disease from person-to-person by discouraging or preventing people from coming in close contact with each other. Currently available information suggests that early and aggressive use of social distancing measures may provide the greatest benefit toward slowing the spread of an influenza pandemic. Specific social distancing strategies could include: closing public and private schools; minimizing social interactions at colleges, universities, houses of worship and libraries; closing non-essential government functions; implementing emergency staffing plans for the public and private sector including increasing telecommuting, flex scheduling and other options; and closing public gathering places including stadiums, theaters, community centers and other facilities.
a. The effectiveness of social distancing strategies is not known with certainty, nor is the degree of public compliance with measures that is necessary for success.

b. Implementation of social distancing strategies in King County may create social disruption and significant, long-term economic impacts. It is unknown how the public will respond to these measures.

c. It is assumed that social distancing strategies must be applied on a countywide or statewide basis in order to maximize effectiveness.

2. The Local Health Officer will consult with the Disease Control Officer for Communicable Disease, the Director of Preparedness and the Public Health Veterinarian throughout all phases of a pandemic regarding the epidemiology and impact of the pandemic in and around King County.

3. The Local Health Officer will review social distancing strategies and current epidemiological data during each phase and coordinate with the King County Executive, the Mayor of Seattle, and executive heads of other cities and towns regarding social distancing actions that should be implemented to limit the spread of the disease.

4. Decisions regarding the implementation of social distancing measures including suspending large public gatherings and closing stadiums, theaters, houses of worship, community centers, and other facilities where large numbers of people gather will be made jointly and concurrently by the Local Health Officer and the King County Executive and coordinated with all executive heads of cities and towns in King County.

5. Decisions regarding the closing of all public and private schools, licensed child care centers, and minimizing social interaction at colleges, universities and libraries in King County will be made by the Local Health Officer after consultation with local school superintendents, child care center operators, school presidents and elected officials.

6. The Local Health Officer will coordinate in advance the timing and implementation of social distancing decisions in King County with Pierce, Snohomish, Kitsap and Thurston Counties as well as the state Department of Health and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (see Appendix D3).

7. Social Distancing Strategies During Phases 1, 2, 3

a. The Preparedness Section and Community Based Public Health Practice Section is coordinating with the PHSKC PIO, Communicable Disease Section, and Health Care for the Homeless Section to educate elected
officials, government leaders, school officials, response partners, homeless services agencies, businesses, the media and the public regarding the consequences of pandemics, the use of social distancing strategies, the associated impacts they cause and the process for implementing these measures.

b. Health Care for the Homeless is coordinating with the Communicable Disease Section and the PHSKC Medical Director to provide guidance and instructions regarding infection control strategies to homeless service agencies that operate congregate care facilities.

c. The Local Health Officer will confirm the decision making process and criteria for recommending social distancing strategies with the King County Executive, the Mayor of Seattle and all other executive heads of cities and towns.

7. Social Distancing Strategies During Phases 4, 5, 6

a. The Local Health Officer will coordinate with elected officials regarding decision making and implementation of social distancing strategies that are commensurate with the severity of illness and societal impact of the pandemic.

b. Specific, county-wide strategies that may be identified by the Local Health Officer include:

i. Direct government agencies and the private sector to implement emergency staffing plans to maintain critical business functions while maximizing the use of telecommuting, flex schedules, and alternate work site options.

ii. Recommend that the public use public transit only for essential travel.

iii. Advise King County residents to defer non-essential travel to other areas of the country and the world affected by pandemic influenza outbreaks.

iv. Suspend public events where large numbers of people congregate including sporting events, concerts, and parades.

v. Close public and private schools, and licensed child care centers

vi. Implement measures to limit social interaction at libraries, houses of worship, colleges and universities

vii. Close all theaters, community centers, and other places where large groups gather.
viii. Suspend government functions not involved in pandemic response or maintaining critical continuity functions.

c. The Local Health Officer will participate in conference calls with neighboring counties, the state Department of Health and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services to coordinate the timing, public announcement, and impacts of social distancing measures in the Puget Sound Region (see Appendix D3).

d. The Local Health Officer will monitor the effectiveness of social distancing strategies in controlling the spread of disease and will advise appropriate decision-makers when social distancing strategies should be relaxed or ended.
IX. Health and Medical Response

A. Overview

1. A severe influenza pandemic is expected to significantly increase the demand for health care services at a time when the availability of health care workers will be reduced due to illness. Consequently, the imbalance between supply and demand is likely to overwhelm current health care system capacity and necessitate restrictive strategies to best manage the demand on health care system resources.

2. During a pandemic, all efforts will be employed to sustain the functionality of the health care system while maintaining an acceptable level of medical care. In order to accomplish this, health care delivery system partners may need to:
   a. limit the provision of health care services to patients with urgent, health problems;
   b. take steps to increase health care system capacity for patients who would normally require inpatient care;
   c. mobilize, reassign and deploy staff within and between health care facilities to address critical shortfalls;
   d. implement patient triage and resource management processes;
   e. provide alternative mechanisms for patients to address non-urgent health care needs such as telephone and internet-based consultation.

B. Unified Command of the Health and Medical Response

1. A severe influenza pandemic will likely generate significant health and medical impacts across all jurisdictions and functional agencies within King County. An effective response to the consequences of a pandemic will require integrated and coordinated management and direction by organizations with specific authorities, responsibilities and expertise in health and medical services. Therefore, upon activation of the PHSKC Pandemic Influenza Response Plan, Unified Command will be implemented to effectively manage and direct the countywide health and medical response. The following parties within the King County health care system will have command responsibilities within Unified Command:
• Local Health Officer
  o Policy lead for the public health response
  o Informs and advises locally elected officials regarding the health consequences throughout the incident
  o Maintains overall legal authority for the health and medical response

• Health Care Coalition Executive Council
  o Comprised of Chief Executives from hospitals, large health practices
  o Direct the hospital-based and ambulatory care response within their facilities

• EMS Medical Directors
  o Comprised of the EMS Medical Directors for King County and the City of Seattle
  o Direct the implementation of response protocols for all paramedics and Emergency Medical Technicians in King County
  o Direct the implementation of the King County – Seattle EMS Infectious Disease and Pandemic Plan, June 2006

• King County Medical Examiner
  o Directs the county-wide response to mass fatalities events
  o Maintains legal authorities governing the identification, transportation and final disposition of human remains during mass fatalities events

2. An organizational structure utilizing Unified Command to lead the health and medical response across King County will ensure that each agency involved in the response is aware of the plans, actions and constraints of all others. No agency participating under Unified Command will compromise their legal authorities or requirements. Participating agencies will minimize inefficiency and duplication of effort, improve information flow, and combine efforts toward achieving a single set of response objectives.

3. The Unified Command will be responsible for:

a. Establishing a common set of operational objectives and implementation strategies (Incident Action Plan) for the countywide health and medical response;

b. Directing specific operational components of the health and medical response including the activation and management of Alternate Care Facilities and activation of medical call center and web-based triage systems;
c. Jointly coordinating the accuracy and dissemination of health and medical information to the public through a Joint Information System;

d. Coordinating medical resource ordering and management through the Regional Medical Resource Center and the Public Health Emergency Operations Center (PH EOC).

4. Communications

a. The Unified Command members will coordinate primarily via conference calls and video conference throughout the duration of a pandemic.

b. Health and medical public information messages will be coordinated among all health care partners through a Joint Information System consistent with policies defined in the Regional Disaster Plan.

5. Operations

The Operations Section of the Unified Command will coordinate the following region-wide functions:

a. Identification, activation, and management of Alternate Care Facilities throughout King County.

i. Upon receiving direction from the Unified Command, the Operations Section will coordinate with the Regional Medical Resource Center, the PH EOC and local Emergency Operations Centers as needed, to identify and activate Alternate Care Facilities.

ii. These facilities would add to the existing bed capacity in the county and provide supportive care to influenza patients, or could serve as triage facilities (flu triage clinics) to relieve the burden on hospital emergency departments.

iii. The Operations Section will coordinate with the PH EOC, local EOCs, schools, and businesses, as needed, to locate appropriate facilities, and identify and mobilize appropriate staffing, supplies, security resources, transportation resources and other logistical support issues consistent with Alternate Care Facilities plans developed by PHSKC.

iv. During a pandemic response, the State Secretary of Health will direct and ensure the licensing of alternate care facilities established by local health departments and hospitals.
b. Activation and oversight of a communitywide medical triage system incorporating 24-hour telephone consulting nurse service and web-based information systems.

c. PHSKC, the Hospital Emergency Management Committee, and the EMS Advisory Committee will identify and train personnel to serve as Operations Section Chief under the Unified Command. The Section Chief will be located within the Regional Medical Resource Center.

6. Logistical Support

a. Coordination and mobilization of countywide medical resources in support of the Unified Command will occur through the Regional Medical Resource Center (operational plans under development).

b. The PH EOC will coordinate public health resources in support of the countywide health and medical response. Requests for State and Federal support, including the Strategic National Stockpile, will be managed by the PH EOC.

c. Local EOCs throughout the county will be relied upon, consistent with policies established in the Regional Disaster Plan, to provide non-medical logistical and resource support to the Unified Command.

7. Planning

The Planning Section of the Unified Command will coordinate two functions:

a. Develop a unified incident action plan (IAP) and operational objectives for each operational period providing policy level direction for the countywide health and medical response. Submit the IAP for approval by the Unified Command and distribute to response partners.

b. Develop and implement systems for tracking health and medical resources, field response facilities and personnel, and the status of health and medical facilities. Provide status reports, at intervals defined in the IAP, to the Unified Command.

c. Coordinate planning activities between multiple facilities including the Regional Medical Resource Center, PH EOC, local EOCs and EMS operations centers.
C. Preparedness and Response Actions

1. Health and Medical Preparedness During Phases 1, 2, 3
   
   a. PHSKC is educating health care providers about influenza pandemics and involve them in community pandemic response planning through the Health Care Coalition.

   b. PHSKC is incorporating existing groups, such as the Outbreak Response Work Group and the Region 6 Hospital Emergency Preparedness Committee, into pandemic planning efforts through the Health Care Coalition.

   c. Hospitals and health care organizations are developing pandemic influenza response plans addressing at a minimum medical surge capacity, triage, infection control, communications and staffing issues.

   d. PHSKC provides technical assistance to health system partners regarding development of a Medical Reserve Corps and other strategies to expand staffing resources.

   e. Preparedness Section is facilitating development of protocols for reprioritizing PHSKC functions during a pandemic and mobilizing staff to support maintenance of critical public health and medical needs.

   f. PHSKC is providing regular briefings to Health Care Coalition members regarding the status of a novel virus and its potential for causing a pandemic.

   g. PHSKC (King County Medic One) has developed and currently maintains the King County and Seattle EMS Infections Disease and Pandemic Plan.

   h. PHSKC is coordinating with the Region 6 Hospital Emergency Preparedness Committee to ensure systems are in place to track the following items during a pandemic outbreak:

      i. Number of available Intensive Care Unit and medical beds (adults and pediatrics)

      ii. Number of available emergency department beds (monitored and non-monitored)

      iii. Number of patients and / or waiting times in emergency departments
iv. Number of patients waiting for inpatient beds (in emergency departments and clinics)

v. Number of hospitals on emergency department divert status

vi. Hospital and Medical Examiner morgue capacity

vii. Shortages of medical supplies or equipment

viii. Staff absenteeism at hospitals, clinics and morgues

2. Health and Medical Response During Phases 4, 5, 6

a. PHSKC will facilitate activation of Unified Command for the countywide health and medical response.

b. PHSKC will work with the Health Care Coalition to heighten preparedness activities and monitor the impact of a pandemic on health care facilities and systems.

c. Communicable Disease Section will provide case identification criteria, laboratory testing and treatment protocols, and other case management resources to health care providers in the region.

d. Communicable Disease Section will coordinate with health care system members to assure appropriate use of antiviral medicines.

e. The PHSKC Medical Director for Clinical Operations will develop and disseminate instructions for the care of patients who can be treated at home.

f. The Unified Command will evaluate the need for and feasibility of establishing a system separate from hospital emergency departments for patient triage and clinical evaluation. The Unified Command will develop criteria for activating and deactivating such facilities. Specific tasks may include:

i. Hospitals will establish separate triage areas for 1) persons presenting with possible influenza, fever or respiratory disease, and 2) persons at high risk for severe complications such as pregnant women and immunocompromised persons.

ii. The Unified Command will, through coordination between PHSKC, hospitals, the large medical group practices, local EOCs and community partners, identify and activate Alternate Care Facilities and flu triage clinics across King County.
iii. The Unified Command will activate a communitywide medical triage system incorporating 24-hour telephone consulting nurse service and web-based information systems.

g. The Health Care Coalition will develop standardized criteria for implementing the following strategies countywide, and will recommend implementation of any or all of these strategies to the Local Health Officer when pandemic conditions warrant:

i. Canceling elective admissions and elective surgeries

ii. Requiring all hospitals in the county to receive and treat any patient whose condition warrants hospitalization, regardless of medical insurance coverage.

iii. Implementing protocols to expand internal hospital bed capacity.

iv. Activating alternate care facilities to conduct triage of flu patients or to provide expanded bed capacity.

v. Implementing early discharge protocols for patients not requiring inpatient care.

vi. Implementing protocols for enhanced infection control in all medical facilities.


h. King County and Seattle EMS Medical Directors, through the Unified Command, will direct implementation of the King County and Seattle EMS Infectious Disease and Pandemic Plan, as appropriate.

i. Health Care Coalition members will identify and prioritize staff to receive antiviral medications and influenza vaccine according to the protocols established by PHSKC.

j. Through a Public Health Order, the Local Health Officer may direct the compliance of health care providers with PHSKC protocols for use of antiviral medications and influenza vaccine.

B. Public Health Services

1. During a pandemic, PHSKC may suspend routine Department operations to provide staff for flu clinics, triage centers, and telephone triage services.
2. The Local Health Officer will assess the need to reprioritize Department functions and will direct the mobilization of staff to meet emerging needs of the pandemic.

3. PHSKC staff with clinical training and licensure may be reassigned by the Medical Director to support the Department’s critical clinical functions during a pandemic, or to assist in pandemic response activities.

4. PHSKC will continue to provide health care services to the King County Jail during a pandemic, but may temporarily suspend preventive care services.

5. Public Health Services During Phases 1, 2, 3
   a. All PHSKC Divisions and sections are:
      i. Participating in business continuity planning to identify mission critical systems and functions that must remain operational during a pandemic.
      ii. Identifying PHSKC services and functions that can be suspended during a pandemic thereby freeing up staff members for reassignment.
      iii. Participating in ongoing planning efforts to assess skills needed during public health emergencies and identify staff training needs to fill critical positions.
   b. The Community Health Services Division Director and Medical Director are identifying sites and functions within the Department’s clinical services that will remain operational during a pandemic and specify the minimum level of resources needed to remain operational.
   c. The King County Medical Examiner’s Office (KCMEO) is coordinating mass fatality planning efforts with hospitals and funeral homes through the Health Care Coalition.

6. Public Health Services During Phases 4, 5, 6
   a. The Local Health Officer will determine the need to suspend routine Department operations in order to reassign staff to critical duties. The timing of this decision will be coordinated with similar actions taken by other clinical facilities in the health care system.
   b. Critical functions activated within PHSKC may include:
i. Utilizing some or all Public Health clinics as “flu clinics” to triage, evaluate and / or treat influenza patients not requiring hospital care.

ii. Establishing and supporting a public call center that provides information and medical advice over the telephone, including information on how to access the health care system.

iii. Distributing vaccine to health care system facilities and activating mass vaccination clinics to vaccinate priority groups.

c. The KCMEO may activate the Public Health Mass Fatalities Plan. Activation of the plan will be coordinated with hospitals and funeral homes throughout the county.

d. Based on the numbers of actual or anticipated fatalities during a pandemic, the KCMEO may implement emergency protocols regarding:

   i. Identification and documentation of victims

   ii. Activation and management of temporary temperature controlled holding facilities

   iii. Release of remains to family members

   iv. Temporary internment of mass fatalities

   v. Cremation and burial of mass fatalities
X. **MAINTENANCE OF ESSENTIAL SERVICES**

1. One of the critical needs during a flu pandemic will be to maintain essential community services.
   
a. With the possibility that 25-35% of the workforce could be absent due to illness, it may be difficult to maintain adequate staffing for certain critical functions.
   
b. There is the possibility that services could be disrupted if significant numbers of public health, law enforcement, fire and emergency response, medical care, transportation, communications, and public utility personnel are unable to carry out critical functions due to illness.

2. Government agencies and private businesses, particularly those that provide essential services to the public, must develop and maintain continuity of operations plans and protocols that address the unique consequences of a pandemic.

3. Local emergency management agencies in King County will lead continuity of government planning and preparedness within their jurisdictions with technical support provided by PHSKC.

4. Local emergency management agencies in King County will participate in and support logistical and non-medical infrastructure planning with hospital facilities within their jurisdictions.

5. PHSKC will develop continuity of operations plans that address, at a minimum:
   
a. Line of Succession for the agency.
   
b. Approval of continuity of operations plans by the King County Board of Health.
   
c. Identification of mission essential services and priorities.
   
d. Procedures for the reassignment of employees to support public health functions essential during a public health emergency.
   
e. Redundancy of mission critical communication and information systems.
   
f. Physical relocation of critical PHSKC functions including the Department Emergency Operations Center.
6. Maintenance of Essential Services During Phases 1, 2, 3

   a. Preparedness Section works with all divisions and sections in PHSKC to develop plans for maintaining essential departmental services during a pandemic.

   b. Preparedness Section and Community Based Public Health Practice Section continue to educate government agencies, non-profit organizations and businesses that provide essential community services about the need for continuity planning in advance of a pandemic.

7. Maintenance of Essential Services During Phases 4, 5, 6

   a. PHSKC will update its essential services plans and will request that its community partners update their plans.

   b. The Local Health Officer will determine the appropriate time to implement the Department’s continuity of operations plans and protocols and will advise community partners to implement their plans as needed.
XI. Recovery

1. Recovery from an influenza pandemic will begin when it is determined that adequate supplies, resources and response system capacity exists to manage ongoing activities without continued assistance from pandemic response systems.

2. In consultation with the Health Care Coalition and local elected leaders, the Local Health Officer will recommend specific actions to be taken to return the health care system and government functions to pre-event status.

3. PHSKC will assess the impact of the pandemic on the community’s health as measured by morbidity and mortality and report findings to all response partners.

4. PHSKC staff will support partners in King County government and the health care and business communities in assessing the economic impact of the pandemic.

5. Preparedness Section will conduct an after-action evaluation of the pandemic response. The evaluation will include recommendations for amendments to the Pandemic Influenza Response Plan.